Since Biggio et al. (2013) and Szegedy et al. (2013) first drew attention to adversarial examples, there has been a flood of research into defending and attacking machine learning models. However, almost all proposed attacks assume whitebox access to a model. In other words, the attacker is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the models weights and architecture. With this insider knowledge, a white-box attack can leverage gradient information to craft adversarial examples. Black-box attacks assume no knowledge of the model weights or architecture. These attacks craft adversarial examples using information only contained in the logits or hard classification label. Here, we assume the attacker can use the logits in order to find an adversarial example. Empirically, we show that 2-sided stochastic gradient estimation techniques are not sensitive to scaling parameters, and can be used to mount powerful black-box attacks requiring relatively few model queries.
GRADIENT ESTIMATION METHODS
Black-box attacks usually rely on either the transferability property of adversarial examples (Papernot et al. (2016) ) or gradient estimation techniques. Gradient estimation techniques such as finite differences come at the expense of the number of model queries. To estimate the gradient of a d dimensional vector requires 2d model queries, since the gradient of each dimension is measured independently. For this reason, recent work has explored stochastic methods for approximating the true gradient (Ilyas et al. (2018) ; Uesato et al. (2018) ). Given a model f 1 and an input x ∈ R d , we estimate the gradient by one of the following methods:
where δ ∈ R is a small constant and ξ i , ∆ i ∈ R d are random vectors sampled from some distribution P . We observed that the choice of P is largely unimportant; black-box attack success for P ∼ N (0, I) (NES (Ilyas et al. (2018) 
is approximately equivalent. Gradient estimation given by (1) is referred to as 1-sided, and gradient estimation given by (2) is referred to as 2-sided. For all attacks, we take ξ i = ∆ −1 i , and the estimation can be viewed as finite differences on a random basis.
EXPERIMENTS
We run the PGD attack (Madry et al. (2017) ) with gradient estimation, for ǫ = 0.05 on the NIPS 2017 adversarial vision competition dataset (Kurakin et al. (2018) ). This consists of 1000 Imagenet- like images of size 299 × 299 × 3. For each image, we select the least likely class as the adversarial example target class. We consider the attack successful if the predicted class is the target class and x − x adv ∞ < ǫ, and the attack requires fewer than one million queries to the model. Table 1 shows the results for different choices of random directions. For 2-sided attacks, all achieve perfect success rates in crafting adversarial examples, while exhibiting little sensitivity to the choice of δ. For 1-sided SPSA, the attack is extremely sensitive to the choice of δ; for a δ of 0.01, the attack is successful fewer than one times in ten, while a δ of 0.0001 the attack has near perfect success rate and also requires on average only 10244 queries, 3475 fewer than the best 2-sided attack.
In conclusion, we found that the choice of random direction is largely unimportant in practical attacks. An attacker choosing a 1-sided perturbation may require fewer queries to the model, however this is heavily dependent on the choice of δ. Reproducible code can be found at https://github.com/jhayes14/black-box-attacks.
